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1CHAPTER • I 
INTRODUCTION
The division of the Korean peninsula into North and 
South, a legacy of the Cold War, was turned into a hot war 
in 1950. Because of its bitter experiences in this war, 
South Korea has remained one of those countries where anti­
communist sentiment runs very high despite the changes that 
have taken place in the world since 1950. Even when the 
era of Cold War yield to that of detente in the 1970s, the 
Cold War in Korea continued between the two competing 
states.
The Korean peninsula is a strategically important 
area where the interests of four powers— China, Japan, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States— intersect. His­
torically, Korea has served as a buffer state between 
China and the Soviet Union, and between Japan and the 
Soviet Union. It is natural that each of these powers 
wants Korea to remain friendly to itself. If one of them 
seeks to exercise hegemony over Korea, the latter cannot 
help but fall victim to the conflict between the contending 
powers as demonstrated by the Sino-Japanese at the end of
i
Richard H. Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980st 
Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition (Santa Mon­
ica, California: Rand Corporation, 1979)i p. 110.
2the 19th Century and the Russo-Japanese wars that occurred 
at the beginning of this century. A very similar situation 
has existed since World War II.
In addition, the transformation of Sino-Soviet rela­
tions from alliance to confrontation in the 1970s provided 
the major impetus to the trend toward diversity in the glo­
bal balance of power. This was inevitable because the United 
States began to negotiate with the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and the Soviet Union instead of confronting them. As 
these two communist giants themselves sought detente with 
the Western powers, such detente made it possible for other 
communist countries also to explore better relations with the 
Western countries. Since President Nixon made the famous 
trip to Beijing in February, 1972, all the major powers have 
normalized their bilateral relationships with one another. 
Consequently, the bipolar world of the Cold War was replaced 
in Northeast Asia by a four-power balance involving the 
United States, Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union. With 
regard to Korea, the interests of these powers diverse some­
what, but they do not seem to want any change in the exist­
ing territorial status ,quo on the Korean peninsula. But such 
events as the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, the Soviet-Vietnam- 
ese friendship treaty, and Sino-American normalization have 
made the rivalries among the Asian powers more volatile than 
before.
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The Sino-Soviet competition is becoming sharper over 
the Korean peninsula, and in particular over the behavior of 
North Korea. Since the latter borders on the two communist 
powers, both China and the Soviet Union have been trying to 
place North Korea in its own sphere of influence. In fact, 
both Beijing and Moscow concluded treaties of alliance and 
cooperation with Pyongyang in 1961. While Pyongyang has 
endeavored to maintain its neutrality in this rivalry, be­
cause of its geographic proximity and cultural affinity, it 
has leaned toward Beijing in recent years. Despite this com­
petition, however, the Korean question is no longer a direct 
obstacle to Beijing's and Moscow's rapprochement with Wash­
ington. In this sense, therefore, North Korea could become 
increasingly "North Koreanized" and pursue a more independent 
foreign policy.
4Thus, I may hypothesize thati
the more intense Sino-Soviet competition 
becomes over North Korea, the more inde­
pendent military action of North Korea 
will become.
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Figure 2t Pendulum of North Korean Exercise
Shown on Figure 2-A, just as the tides are the high­
est when the gravitational pulls of the sun and the moon 
join together, North Korea was strong when the gravitational 
pulls of the PRC and the Soviet Union were aligned as in the 
beginning of the Korean War in 1950.
Therefore, this paper is confined toi first, 
research of the two communist giants vying for influence 
over North Korea and the relationships among the three coun­
tires. It covers the border clash from 1969 to 1978, a ten-
5year period (shown on Figure 2-B, C). Secondly, to examine 
closely the reactions of the other side when North Korea on 
the pendulum moves from one side to the other. Thirdly, to 
analyze the Sino-Soviet conflict and its impact on North 
Korea (shown on Figure l).
6CHAPTER It
THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE DIVERGENCE OF
MARXISM-LENINISM
Political ideology is an institution that is used to 
further a country's national interest. The existing ideolo­
gies vary from pluralist democracy to communist socialism, 
and a specific national interest may be defined as whichever 
nation-building stage is being highlighted in the political 
system at a given time on the basis of these two variables-- 
ideology and national interest. International conduct can 
be constructed that may be applied to the analysis of con­
temporary world politics.
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Figure 3: Types of International Conduct
7A major activity of many scholars of communism has 
been the attempt to identify the causes or sources of the 
Sino-Soviet conflict. No consensus has resulted from this 
activity. However, four fundamental viewpoints have emerged 
on the Sino-Soviet conflict* (l) the conflict originated as 
a struggle for control of the world communist movement and 
was made virtually inevitable by the appearance of a second 
powerful center in that movement. (2) The clash between 
China and the Soviet Union simply reflects the national 
interests of the two states; the perceptions of national 
interest involved are determined by historical, cultural, or 
geopolitical factors. (3) The conflict arose from the 
vastly different levels of development attained by the two 
societies; that is, it is primarily economic in origin. (4) 
The split originated in essentially different interpreta­
tions of Marxism-Leninism by the ideologically oriented 
elites who dominate the two political systems. The view­
points outlined above are, of course, not necessarily mutu­
ally exclusive. Nevertheless, a major problem in all of 
these explanatory approaches concerns the relationship 
between ideology and power.
An obvious answer to the difficulties encountered in 
attempts to assess the relative importance of ideology and
^William E, Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cam­
bridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 49-54•
Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: Put­
nam’s, 1963)» PP« 236-324.
8power in communist politics is that Marxism-Leninism is, 
above all, an ideology of power. All ideologies must, of 
course, deal with power relationships; Marxism-Leninism is 
distinguished by the fact that it explicitly ties the achieve­
ment of utopian social goals to the development of a particu­
lar kind of political organization and the amassing of social 
power by that organization. Thus, for a Marxist-Leninist any 
question of ideology is immediately a question of political 
power; any question of political power is immediately a ques­
tion of ideology. This conjunction of ideology and power 
means that a satisfactory analysis of conflict between com­
munist party-state systems is unlikely without consideration 
of ideology, for a major function of the ideology is the 
explanation or justification of power relationships.
The Sino-Soviet conflict can best be understood in 
terms of the Marxist-Leninist theory of social development.
The reasons are threefold. First, the Soviets and the Chin­
ese explain fundamental conflicts within this frame of refer­
ence. Second, the application of different developmental 
models, both purportedly Marxist-Leninist, appears to have 
directly resulted empirically in severe conflict situations. 
And finally, continuation of the power of dominant elites in 
these communist political systems is dependent upon the valid­
ity of the propositions contained in their respective vari­
ants of developmental theory; moreover, these elites 
explicitly attribute the legitimacy of their control of
9these societies to Marxist-Leninist developmental theory.
Developmental theory provides the essential theoreti­
cal link between the other two major components of communist 
ideology: the basic worldview or philosophical grounding set
by dialectical materialism and the vision of the future com­
munist utopia. As such, it is obviously the most flexible 
part of the ideology; it also provides the rationale by which 
communist leaders constantly justify their specific politi­
cal actions.
In Marxist theory, political power has its basis in 
functional specialization or the division of labor. Material 
need or functional necessity produces a differentiation of 
social structure and leads to the development of political 
structures controlled by dominant classes. In other words, 
functional specialization is a necessary response to material 
needs and necessarily produces variations in social and 
political power. So long as the production of material 
goods falls short of abundance, functional specialization 
continues, as does the predictable conflict between dominant 
and dependent social elements, who struggle for the control 
of scarce resources. Over time, development of the forces 
of production erodes and eventually destroys the material 
basis for the power of dominant social elements, through the 
elimination of economic necessity. Human material need is 
the vital force driving mankind toward achievement of the 
abundant, nonrepressive society.
10
Regimes established under the standard of Marxism- 
Leninism are not immune to the material necessity identified 
by Marx, or to the production of conflict endemic to the 
developmental process identified by him. Moreover, these 
regimes face the severe problem of equating empirical change 
in the social system with the change dictated by Marx's 
developmental model. Starting from a much lower level of 
development than that indicated as the revolutionary take-off 
stage in the original Marxian model, they must carry out the 
revolutionary economic development produced by capitalism in 
the original model and show that the essential substitution 
of political for economic means will lead to the same goal.
Many roads to communism approach means, of course, 
that the communist system itself accepts and itself begins 
to generate that structural differentiation which, in Marx­
ism, contains such conflict-producing propensities. However, 
if the economically less advanced countries are moving in the 
same general direction as the more advanced countries in 
their processes of development, there is no problem. More­
over, even if this is not the case, the underlying problem 
can be rather effectively masked between crises, if the cen­
ter is in a clearly dominant position, as was done by Khru­
shchev in late 1950s with his conceptualization of the 
Socialist Commonwealth.
11
If there is no single power center, the situation is 
vastly changed. Where there are differences in levels of 
development, different "roads to communism" are virtually 
inevitable. The resulting development must be explained by 
each communist party-state's spokesmen in terms of relevance 
to the ultimate goal. The survival of any single regime 
with a divergent social development constitutes a denial of 
the validity of all other approaches. The interests of the 
dominant elites in the communist party-states with divergent 
patterns of development become inextricably tied to the com­
peting claims to legitimacy that are central to ideological 
conflicts.
Such conflicts are difficult to contain or resolve 
without coercion. Conflict resolution through bargaining 
inevitably involves concessions and compromise; here, diver­
gent patterns of social development assume crucial impor­
tance. Ihe inception of bargaining over ideological ques­
tions means at least provisional recognition of the legiti­
macy of one's bargaining partner's regime. Real settlement 
of ideological issues by such methods would have to include 
explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the bargaining 
partner's social system, thus posing a direct threat to the 
legitimacy of the dominant political elites in the countries 
involved. The reason lies in Marxist ideological claims to 
universality. From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, Com­
munist Party elites are legitimized by the claim that their
12
behavior and ideological positions represent the coining 
universalization of social relations, which will be charac­
terized by the absence of classes and group conflicts. Ack- 
knowledgment of the validity of another approach to communism 
necessarily means some diminution of the legitimacy of a par­
ticular Communist Party's elite, some weakening of claims to 
universality. But one need not consider these matters from 
the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist view of legitimacy; 
there is a very practical matter involved. In communist 
party-states, where competing ideologies cannot be overtly 
expressed, the party elite's claim to represent the future 
of mankind, constantly repeated, is a powerful weapon for 
inducing compliance. Acceptance of a different approach to 
communism in communications media dominated by the elite 
suggests the possibility of political alternatives. This 
break in the monolithic pattern of communications may in­
crease the potential for domestic dissent and so undercut 
elite power.
Mao has long demonstrated a profound awareness of 
these problems of social development. He has, in fact, 
shown a willingness to sacrifice economic development, at 
least in the short run, in order to prevent the bourgeoisi- 
fication of Chinese society. This motivation appeared 
clearly in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.-^ Mao
-'Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese 
Political System," China Quarterly B8 (April-June 1969);63- 
91.
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has pushed for achievement of an undifferentiated social 
structure while economic modernization is in progress. In 
practice, this has meant a drive for social atomization more 
in accord with the traditional model of totalitarianism for­
merly accepted by most Western scholars than with the actual 
practice of the Soviet system. Despite severe conflict, or 
perhaps because of it, Mao has succeeded to a significant 
degree in shaping Chinese society to his vision of develop-
Ll
ment. The Maoist thrust for a more fluid social organiza­
tion adds structural differentiation to the initial develop­
mental divergence between the two societies. All of this is 
reflected in the contrasting evolution of developmental 
theory in the two systems. The Soviet model of development 
in the contemporary epoch could be characterized as the 
routinization of revolution; that is, the Soviets view tech­
nological development and technical expertise as the princi­
pal forces in social transformation. The Chinese model con­
tains distinct anarchistic tendencies, emphasizing what the 
Maoists call "the factor of man," in the Chinese view, social 
transformation can be carried out independently of technolo­
gical development by application of the human will.
kTillman Durdin, "The New Face of Maoist China," 
Problems of Communism XX (September-October 1971)*1-13.
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The Divergence in Developmental Theory 
Permanent Revolution
The Maoist concept of permanent revolution differs 
considerably from Marx's "revolution in permanence" and from 
Trostsky's "permanent revolution."^ The concept has two 
essential and distinctive features. First, the revolution 
must be uninterrupted. As one stage or process is completed, 
there must be immediate movement to the next stage or pro­
cess. Second, revolution continues in the stage of commun­
ism. The process of change is qualitatively different under 
communism, but change continues to occur through qualitative 
leaps. This concept of permanent revolution is quite consis­
tent with, and indeed is inextricably tied to, Mao's general 
theory of contradictions and disequilibrium.
The revolutionary strategy involved here is dictated 
by Mao's concerns about structural development. Of course, 
uninterrupted revolution during the stage of building social­
ism is related to the overwhelming tasks of Chinese economic 
development. No such motivation can be ascribed to Mao's 
projected revolution in Communist society unless he has re­
jected all previous Marxist formulations concerning the 
material base of communism. Clearly, Mao is concerned about 
the tendency of social structures to form and harden and deny 
the projected universal unity at every stage of development#
■^Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of 
the Permanent Revolution, 1958-1969," China Quarterly 46 
(1971)*221-238.
15
Although all political structures, including the Communist 
Party, are subject to the universal law of contradictions, 
the great danger is that the principal contradiction may 
turn out to be the contradiction between dominant political 
structures and the underlying material base. If one politi­
cal structure is destroyed through its internal contradic­
tions, another may arise to take its place. Uninterrupted 
revolution rapidly intensifies the existing contradictions 
and prevents the rise of the feared structural power. The 
political strategy associated with Mao's theory of disequili­
brium thus provides his answer to the long-run problem of 
structured and separate political power. In this general, 
theoretical approach to power, there is no necessary connec­
tion with social class, and so Mao takes another step away 
from the underlying economic motivations of the Marxian 
model.
These Maoist concerns are not reflected in the 
thought of contemporary Soviet theorists. While there is 
no great concern for the problem of increasing complexity 
of social structure at advanced levels of development, no 
Soviet theorist admits the possibility of a real conflict 
of interest between the Communist Party and society as a 
whole.
View of Class
Social class does not have the same importance for 
Marxists as for other Marxists. Moreover, against the Soviet
16
adherence to the orthodox view concerning, the objective basis 
for class development, the Maoists have put forward a loose 
and contradictory concept of class containing both objective 
and subjective elements.
In the Maoist view, the class struggle is an objec­
tive reality independent of man's will. The origin of social 
class is the division of labor, and social class is deter­
mined by one's relationship to the means of production. This 
is an orthodox Marxist position. However, while this ortho­
dox view continues to be maintained in Beijing, an antithe­
tical conception of class is advanced without acknowledgment 
of any contradiction.
This formulation is quite consistant with the Maoist 
distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contra­
dictions and the possibility of continuation of several 
parties into the stage of communism. It appears that, for 
Mao, the primary political aspect of the phase of socialism 
is something other than the resolution of class conflict. 
Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution, certain assertions 
concerning classes and class struggle were put forward which 
definitely conflict with Marxist orthodoxy, and these asser­
tions have not subsequently been disavowed. A subjective 
definition of the term "proletariat," emphasizing adherence 
to "Mao Tse-tung thought," was consistantly found in the 
Maoist polemics. During the Cultural Revolution, an attempt 
was made to purge the party along "class lines," class lines
17
were determined by attitudes toward the thoughts of Mao.
Mao, like Bakunin, acknowledges the existence of an 
economic basis for class conflict. Mao appears to recognize 
that something more fundamental than the class struggle is 
going on in society. With Bakunin, the fundamental struggle 
is against all forms of political power. It is a struggle 
against bureaucratic forms of power. Mao's special contri­
bution here is the suggestion that class struggle and the 
nature of classes themselves can be transformed outside an 
economic context.
The Material Basis for Revolution
In Marxist theory, material development is an abso­
lute precondition for fulfillment of the substantive goals 
of social change and the transformation of human nature. The 
orthodox viewpoint is still fully accepted by Soviet theore­
ticians. Mao made a virtue of necessity, arguing that the 
primitive level of development facilitated revolutionary 
transformation because poor people were naturally disposed 
toward change, action, and revolution. Again, Mao is dealing 
with what is for him the overriding structural problem.
If the revolutionary transformation were to begin at 
advanced levels of economic development, the existing complex 
social structure would pose a major obstacle; for Mao, for­
malized social and political structures are coincident with
^Ralph L. Powell, "The Party, the Government, and the 
Gun," Astan Survey 10(6) (1970)*464.
18
resistance to change. At advanced levels of economic develop­
ment, vast disparities in social and political power ordin­
arily mean that powerful forces exist which have a material 
interest in resisting the revolutionary goals of equality and 
monolithic social organization. In the Maoist view, this is 
true alike of bourgeois societies, which pose the threat of 
counterrevolution.
Primitive social development alone provides the 
objective conditions for effective confrontation of this 
potential problem. Here the material basis has been inade­
quate for development of a power really threatening to the 
revolution by economic forces or bureaucracies. The masses 
have no stake in socio-political inequality. On the con­
trary, according to the Maoists, the masses are prone to a 
value-identification with ideological leaders who posit the 
goals of an abundant society and an undifferentiated social 
structure. If this linkage between leaders and masses can 
be firmly established at the outset of the developmental 
process, then the rise of separate, essentially anti-revolu­
tionary centers of power among intermediate social and poli­
tical structures can be prevented. Thus, for the Maoists, 
the most important social transformation occurs at the outset 
of revolution and is not only independent of but also prior 
to economic development.
Contradictions and Disequilibrium
A theory of contradictions was crucial in Marx's
19
thought. Engels extended Marx's conception of contradictions 
to develop an all-encompassing phenomenology that he claimed 
to be universally valid. Mao has attempted to deal with the 
logical problem involved in Engels' phenomenology, which had 
become accepted as part of Marxist-Leninist dogma— how can a 
phenomenology of universal disequilibrium be made consistent 
with the vision of ultimate order contained in Marx’s philo­
sophy of history? Mao has done this by emphasizing, more 
than any other theorist, the distinction in Marxism-Leninism 
between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions.
According to Mao, contradictions are at the center of 
all phenomena and will continue there even in the stage of 
communism. However, in that ultimate stage, contradictions 
will be nonantagonistic contradictions. Moreover, Mao does 
not tie social contradictions to control of the means of pro­
duction so stringently as was done in Marxism. His distinc­
tion between the national bourgeoisie and the compradors,
8which was central to the New Democracy, shows clearly that 
Mao was thinking at a very early date in terms of a more 
fluid structural development than that postulated by Marx and 
Lenin. Given the primitive level of economic development at­
tained at the outset of revolution, the rather rigid Marxian
7'Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign 
Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1970), p. 25.
8Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," in Selected Works. 
Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965)* pp» 339-
348.
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framework associated with control of the means of production 
might pose virtually insuperable obstacles to economic devel­
opment. That is, if the dominant structure in production was 
poorly developed, so was the counterstructure that would re­
place it. This is not to say that Mao’s theory of contradic­
tions was simply a response to Chinese developmental problems; 
however, his theory, which lies at the heart of Maoist ideo­
logy, was obviously consistent with his perception of the 
awesome problem of economic development in China.
Lenin dealt with the problem of an inadequate social
base for revolution in his Two Tactics. His solution was
superficially similar to Mao's; augmentation of the revolu­
tionary force by other elements opposed to the existing 
political order. Since the proletariat was the only truly 
revolutionary force, however, this alliance could be only 
temporary. Moreover, the economic development directed by 
the vanguard would create in the long-run the social base 
for unity which would make such expedient accretions of 
political power superfluous. With Mao, coalition formation 
loses its quality of temporary tactic and becomes enmeshed 
in his overall view of the sources of social conflict. This
is reflected clearly in Mao's assertion that a coalition of
many parties might continue into the stage of c o m m u n i s m . ^
In Mao's thought, particular social structures do not neces­
sarily and automatically yield patterns of social conflict;
Q
Stuart R. Schram, "The Party in Chinese Communist 
Ideology," China Quarterly 38 (1969)111.
21
what is essential is the attitudes associated with formation 
of the structures and their continuation. Whether a parti­
cular contradiction is antagonistic depends less upon one's 
relationship to control of the means of production than upon 
one's attitude toward the ongoing historical movement. The 
sources of conflict are both internal and external. Mao has 
thus excised a portion of Marx's behavioral teleology and has 
opened up the possibility of the development of consciousness 
independent of economic forces. As Soviet writers quite
rightly claim, Mao’s theorizing contradictions within the
10people strikes directly at the class basis of Marxism.
The current Soviet viewpoint on contradictions is
basically that of Stalin’s gradualism, with allowances made
for possible sudden intensification of contradictions and
consequent upheavals owing to the increasingly desperate
tactics of the imperialists as the power of the capitalist
11system declines. The internal basis for such upheavals is 
primarily increasing antagonistic contradictions that arise 
because of the increasing complexity of social structure 
associated with economic development. Such upheavals are,
100. Vladimirov, et al., "On the 50th Anniversary of 
the Communist Party of China," International Affairs 9 (1971)*
63.
^A. Sovetov, "The Present Stage in the Struggle 
Between Socialism and Imperialism," International Affairs 11 
(1968):3-7; I. Uleimik, ’Leninism and the International Sig­
nificance of the Experience Gained in Socialist Construction," 
International Affairs (February-March 1970)s27-29.
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of course, unwelcome; they are to be guarded against by a 
strengthening of the superstructure. Without sacrificing 
entirely the model of contradictions upon which the Maoist 
theory is based, the Soviets have moved toward a view of 
imposed equilibrium within socialist society, amid the gen­
eral necessary disequilibrium among conflicting world sys­
tems .
The Maoist theory of contradictions provides a 
theoretical basis for social change which differs from both 
the original Marxian and the contemporary Soviet models. If 
contradictions inhere in every political structure, whether 
antagonistic or not, disequilibrium is inevitable. Realiza­
tion of the ultimate utopia is unlikely either through his­
torically necessary structural development or through the 
imposition of political structures upon society. But the 
process remains, engendered by the unavoidable appearance 
of contradictions. Both conflict and order are internalized, 
and Mao moves away from the objective framework so dear to 
Marx. For Mao, disequilibrium is a problem only when viewed 
from the standpoint of structure; when viewed in another 
perspective, it becomes a positive blessing.
Military Means
Mao's maxim that "political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun" flows directly from the analysis underlying 
the Peking Road doctrine. Under conditions of primitive 
social and economic development, with an inadequate prole-
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tarian base, revolution became crucially dependent upon
change in the internal, balance of forces through application
of violence by military forces; military means took prece-
12dence over political means. For Mao, the means dictated 
by Chinese experience appeared to assume over time a quality 
of universal validity. According to Mao, the seizure of 
power by armed force, the settlement of issues by war is 
the central task and highest form of revolution. Much more 
significant is the fact that the military forces have a key 
role not only in the overthrow of political regimes but also 
in the revolutionary transformation of society after the 
seizure of power. Despite Mao’s subjective approach, he 
also requires a structural basis for power. The army forged 
in the revolutionary struggle and thus uniquely armed with 
revolutionary consciousness, becomes the principal force 
available to direct the revolutionary transformation of 
society.
The Soviets have increased their emphasis upon 
military means in recent years; this has resulted in part 
from the pressures of the Sino-Soviet split and in part from 
the problems of cohesion of the East European bloc which led 
to the elaboration of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The political 
upgrading of the Soviet military forces is reflected in the
12Franz Michael, "A Design for Aggression," Problems 
of Communism XX, 1-2 (January-April 1971);65; Donald E.
Davis, "Marxism and People's Wars," Orbis XV ^ (Winter 1972): 
1199.
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the increase in the percentage of military men on the new 
Central Committee elected at the Twenty-fourth Party Con­
gress. ^  Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership continues to 
insist upon the primacy of political over military means 
within socialist systems. Inroads by military officers into 
leading party bodies remain quite limited, despite their 
recent gains; it seems clear that now, as in the past, mili­
tary leaders cannot be regarded as potential competitors for 
political power against the civilian leadership of the CPSV.
The Role of the Party
The CCP has never gained the kind of dominance
usually possessed by the party in communist party-states.
The CCP apparently has also never been regarded as the sole
iZj,
bearer of legitimacy within the political system. For 
Mao, legitimacy is tied to process but evidently not to 
specific organizations involved in social development. The 
Soviets, on the other hand, continue to insist upon the 
centrality of the party's role in the developmental process, 
and in fact call for the strengthening of the party as an 
organizational system at advanced levels of development.
The contrasting theoretical formulations summarized 
above are related to the extreme differences in levels of
^Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central 
Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," World Politics
XXIV 3 (April 1972)09^.
1^Schram, "Party in Chinese Ideology, pp. 5-7 .
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social and economic development between the two societies at 
the inception of their revolutions. However, practical 
application of these theoretical formulations has served 
also to create essentially different social and political 
structures and additional differences in developmental pro­
blems. The Soviet model is much more conducive to further 
differentiation of social structure. The Chinese model 
invites disruptions in economic development. Application of 
the models produces effects that are virtually certain to 
have decisive impact upon relations between the two commun­
ist party-states and upon their roles in the international 
political system. These effects may be briefly summarized:
1.) The two models contain contrasting assumptions 
concerning the sources of political power. For the Soviets, 
political power is economically based, and Soviet power has 
been, and continues to be, dependent upon development of 
economic structure. For the Maoists, political power arises 
from mobilization of the masses.
2.) The two models point toward different centers 
of power and different ancillary power structures. In the 
Soviet Union, the power center is a massive party bureau­
cracy that owes its existence to its specific role in Soviet 
economic development. In China, the power center is an 
inner-party or supra-party ideological elite. In the Soviet 
Union, the ancillary structures are composed of technologi­
cally oriented elites, principally the Soviet military-
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industrial complex. J In China, the primary ancillary 
structure is the army.
3.) Application of the Soviet model is less likely 
to lead to domestic political instability than is application 
of that of the Maoists. The Chinese emphasis upon revolution 
‘'from below" makes likely, and Mao has actively promoted, per­
iodic revolutionary convulsions directed against domestic 
bureaucracies. The Soviet model, on the other hand, empha­
sizes controlled and relatively low-key mobilization of the
4
masses and is specifically directed toward the containment 
of political instability. These different approaches are 
likely in the short-run to accentuate the substantial Soviet 
advantages in political, military, and economic power. How­
ever, in the long-run, the power of these major communist 
party-states is dependent upon their relative success in 
applying the models and upon world trends of development.
If the Maoist model has general validity, Soviet power will 
be ultimately overwhelmed by bourgeoisification and inescap­
able contradictions of socialism. On the other .hand, if the 
Soviets are right about the essential parallelism between 
structural and functional development, then the Chinese 
communists cannot generate enough political power to make 
possible the continuation of the Maoist system. China faces
1 *5^Vernon V. Aspatunan, Internal Politics and For­
eign Policy in the Soviet System, Approaches to Comparative 
and International Politics (Evanstons Northwestern Univer- 
sity Press, 1966), pp. 212-221.
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the problem of technological encirclement; the Soviets 
confront the problem of structural fragility. Thus devel­
opmental theory is not simply an abstraction; it is crucially 
tied to the survival of these conflicting systems.
Ideological Struggle and Sino-Soviet Relations 
It appears that developmental theory is both an 
indicator of primary conflict and a source of secondary 
conflict among communist political systems. The Soviet and 
Chinese variants of Marxist-Leninist developmental theory 
originated in the interests of dominant political structures 
confronted internally with vastly different patterns of 
social relationships. In other words, the emergence of 
different approaches to social development can be explained 
largely as a matter of reaction to developmental levels al­
ready attained at the outset of revolution. If this were 
the only aspect of the conflict, we would have a simple 
struggle between the "haves” and the ’’have-nots. ” This ini­
tial divergence was complicated, however, by the pronounced 
tendency of communist elites to legitimize their actions by 
reference to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Over time, the 
political elites in the Soviet and Chinese systems formulated 
two distinct models of social development, each of which in 
its main features was claimed to have universal validity. 
These formulations have provided the central issues of the 
Sino-Soviet conflict.
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The general conflict in Sino-Soviet relations result­
ing from application of these two developmental models has 
many forms and nuances; here it is sufficient to point out 
two significant aspects* First, the Chinese developmental 
model obviously challenges the legitimacy of dominant Soviet 
elites. Second, while the Chinese development of the produc­
tive forces is undeniably impressive, application of the Mao­
ist developmental model has weakened the Chinese political 
system vis-a-vis the external world of crucial points. That 
weakening renders China vulnerable to the political and mili­
tary power of the Soviet elites challenged by Mao. The new 
politics of coalition formation since 1970 can be seen to 
follow directly from those aspects of Sino-Soviet relations 
that are tied to developmental theory. Soviet and Chinese 
political elites explicitly view each other as constituting
a greater threat for the short-run than does the leading
16capitalist power.
Here we must look to the actual development of 
social structure in the two systems and the accompanying 
ideological development. In the Soviet case, both the over­
whelming bureaucratization of Soviet society and the party’s 
ideological pronouncements point toward powerful and growing 
conservative tendencies. For the foreseeable future, Soviet 
political elites must necessarily view the revolutionary
16I. Alexeyev, "Anti-Sovietism in Peking's Strategy," 
International Affairs 7 (July 1973)t21-23.
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thrust of Maoism as posing a severe potential threat to their 
conservative dominance.
More importantly, account must he taken of the real 
practical consequences of Mao's revolution for Chinese soci­
ety. Maoism has provided the energizing goal-culture of the 
Chinese revolution;^ that revolution has produced internal 
changes in social structure and social relationships far 
surpassing the internal changes in social structure and 
social relationships far surpassing the internal changes 
wrought by the French Revolution. Since this is the case, 
Mao's successors could carry out an overt renunciation and 
reversal of Maoism only at the probable cost of serious 
domestic upheavals which would further weaken China vis-a- 
vis the external world. And this appears to be the price 
demanded by the Soviets for a resumption of fraternal social­
ist ties.
Temporary stabilization of Sino-Soviet relations, 
including the resolution of boundary disputes and peripheral 
issues, certainly cannot be ruled out. But resolution of 
the broader issues discussed above poses problems of much 
greater difficulty and complexity. For the foreseeable 
future, it seems likely that both Soviet and Chinese politi­
cal elites will find a continuation of existing tensions to 
be less of a threat to internal control and cohesion than a 
resolution of their ideological conflict.
17Chalmers Johnson, Change in Communist Systems 
(Stanfords Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 6-7.
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CHAPTER III
SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIAN POLITICS
During the 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations changed very 
little: the entire ten years saw continued military confron­
tation, diplomatic encirclement and counterencirclement, 
ideological estrangement, and the atrophy of economic ties.
In contrast, all around the two countries, and throughout the 
globe, the character of political and economic relations 
changed more in this decade than in any other period in the 
last two centuries. How did China and the Soviet Union so 
successfully insulate their relationship from the immense 
shift that occurred everywhere else? Alternatively, are 
important shifts in intra-communist relations about to occur 
in response to the cumulative effect of recent changes? The 
answer is important, for relations between Moscow and Beijing 
form one leg of the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle 
that occupies the center of international relations and 
vitally affects the foreign policies of all Asian countries, 
even in Western states.
The ten years from 1969 to 1979 began with the two 
communist giants in Asia at military confrontations. Follow­
ing a series of small scale but symbolically important border
31
clashes in the spring and summer of 1969* the Russians had 
coerced the Chinese into agreeing to several arms control 
measures along the border and to reopening the long-suspended 
border talks. Moscow followed that up with a large military 
deployment that upset even further the balance between the 
two antagonists, panicked Beijing into thinking that war was 
around the corner, and drove the Chinese into the hands of 
their previously most hated enemies, Japan and America.
Through the decade, Soviet military superiority was 
so great in Beijing’s eyes that even the death of Mao Tse- 
tung whose personal anti-Sovietism was the most important 
factor in the decline of Sino-Soviet relations did not immed­
iately free his successors to renew discussions even for an
interim settlement, lest the Kremlin drive too hard a bar- 
18gain. Indeed, although the threat of imminent war had 
passed by mid-decade, China still felt the need to continue 
its insurance policies in Washington by striving to construct 
an all-around global anti-Soviet coalition. The result, 
thanks to Chinese persistence, perceived Soviet expansionism, 
and Japanese and American cooperation, was restoration of a 
diplomatic balance. This paid dividends in 1979 when China 
turned military upon its old Vietnamese ally— now solidly 
linked with the Soviet Union--to prevent it from becoming the
18Solomon, Aslan Security in the 1980s. pp. A6-52.
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dominant force in Southeast Asia, So things ended about 
where they had started* Moscow and Beijing still faced each 
other across a long, heavily armed, and hostile border and 
each 'continued to mortgage too much of its overall foreign 
policy to the struggle against the other.
The end of the decade did, however, differ from the 
beginning in several regards. Perhaps most importantly, 
decision makers in both Moscow and Beijing were sensitized, 
by the three occasions of Sino-Soviet war or near war, to 
the ultimate need for a modus vivendi. In this regard, the 
Vietnam crisis of 1979 was more important that the two mili­
tary confrontations earlier in the decade, because only in 
this case did both the Soviet and the Chinese leaderships
face the possibility of large-scale war and uncontrollable 
19escalation. Secondly, the character of Asian international 
relations had changed enormously. Thirdly, the overall 
international system, both political and economic, had 
undergone great modifications that have influenced all 
actors, including Moscow and Beijing. Finally, the Soviet 
and Chinese societies have each gone through important evo­
lutions in the intervening years, with the result that the 
domestic motivations of their respective foreign policies, 
toward each other and in general, had increasingly shifted 
direction.
19'C.G. Jacobsen, Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao:
The Chairman* s Legacy (New York* Praeger Publishers, 1981, 
pp. 96-103.
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With the possible exception of the 19^0s, Asia 
changed more in the 1970s than during any other decade in 
the last two centuries. The most important development has 
been the emergence of six modern, rapidly growing, capital­
ist, developed states or city-states along the eastern peri­
phery of the continent. Stretching from South Korea in the 
north through Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malay­
sia in the south, these states have set the economic pace for 
Asia as a whole, are economic models for other developing 
states in Asia and elsewhere, constitute a grouping whose 
size and common interests rival those of the European com­
munities, and exert an increasingly strong pull on the cen­
trally planned, but slower growing, communist economies on 
the Asian land mass. Both Russia and China feel themselves 
caught in the dynamic field of these states' economic pro­
gress, so that much of the Sino-Soviet rivalry during the 
decade has taken the form of competitive economic appeals to 
Japan, rivalry as to who could better assist the North Kor­
eans in keeping up economically with the South Koreans, and
attempts to profit from the economic growth of noncommunist
20Southeast Asia.
If the Sino-Soviet conflict had not been so acute, 
the Chinese would have been overjoyed at this prospect, for 
it represented the fulfillment of one of their major policy
20A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in 
East Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
pp. 130-132.
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goals, often enunciated since 1949. However, the Chinese 
were so fearful of the Soviet military threat that even they 
had to join the chorus of Asian statemen calling upon the
21new American president to come back to his policy senses.
By the end of the decade, these cries, and those of many for­
eign policy analysts within the United States, seemed to 
have been heard, for the United States began to renew its 
interest and activism in Asia. To be sure, much of the 
resurgence in American policy attention to Asia was the pro­
duct of the desire to use the new Chinese connection for 
anti-Soviet purposes or to claim that too much had been 
solved through Sino-American normalization. But much of it 
also derived from the belated realization that Asia had be­
come the United States' greatest trading partner, that Asia 
still was a cockpit of global conflict, that only in north­
east Asia did Soviet-American-Chinese and Japanese interests
22geographically coalesce.
The third major change in Asian international rela­
tions in the 1970s was the parallel emergence of China and 
Japan into policy activism. The causes of this activism 
were, of course, quite different. In the Japanese case, 
they were almost entirely economic. What influence Tokyo 
gained in Beijing and Moscow derived almost exclusively from 
its large gross national product, its high rate of growth,
^Ibid,, pp. 134-136.
22Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. pp. 109-113.
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its foreign trade dynamism, and its capacity to export tech­
nology to anyone who could pay the right fee. In the Chinese 
case, the reasons were almost entirely political. During the 
Cultural Revolution, China had isolated itself virtually com­
pletely from the external world; a large part of Beijing's 
diplomatic activity was therefore an attempt to restore China 
to its self-perceived natural place at the center of the 
Asian international order.
These Japanese and Chinese developments meant that, 
for the first time in modern history, the two most important 
Asian states were actively engaged in the region and were 
friendly toward each other. The character of Asian interna­
tional relations was, therefore, unprecedented. These 
changes also accentuated continued American involvement and 
increasing Soviet activism. It was, in fact, expansion of 
Soviet involvement in Asia and the possibility of a Soviet 
strategic breakout from its traditional position of geogra­
phic isolation from Asia that threatened permanently to up-
21set the Asian balance of power. J This constituted the fourth 
major change in Asia during the 1970s.
. Historically, the very geography of Asia, the neces­
sity for Moscow to devote its still limited resources to 
Europe, and the weakness of the Soviet Union at home had 
combined to keep Russia out of any but peripheral involvement 
in Asian politics. But by the mid-1970s Soviet society was 
23
Jacobsen, Sino-Soviet Relations, pp. 125-132.
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clearly stable and reasonably strong. Moreover, the Soviet 
military build-up had gone far enough that Moscow could 
increasingly invest in building up its strength in Siberia. 
Indeed, the need to deter perceived irrational Chinese actions 
along the Chinese border merely accelerated what had already 
become a clearly perceived policy goal.
There were many manifestations of this new Soviet
activism. Even by the beginning of the decade, Moscow had
become the only external power of consequence in South 
24Asia. Following the end of the Vietnam Alar, it was Moscow 
that wrestled with Beijing over who was to be the most impor­
tant extra-regional power in Southeast Asia. The Soviet 
naval and air build-up in Northeast Asia was largely respon­
sible for the Japanese decision to draw perceptibly closer 
to China, to build-up its own military force, and to renew 
pressure on the United States to continue its own military 
presence.
One immediate result of this new Soviet policy was 
to replace Asian lines of tension that generally went east 
and west, and between communist and noncommunist societies, 
between one communist state and another. Once the Vietnam 
War was past, all conflicts in Asia in the decade involved 
communist military forces on both sides of the battle line. 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia. China invaded Vietnam. The Soviet
^Ibid., pp. 140-142.
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Union threatened China with immense harm. Moreover, the 
traditional flashpoints between communist and noncommunist 
countries dropped below the kindling point, at least tempor­
arily. There was no new north-south war in Korea. The 
intra-communist wars were based materially on a liberal 
supply of Soviet armaments. The decline in East-West con­
flict in Asia was due principally to the combination of 
these internecine communist conflicts and the rise of Amer- 
ican-Japanese assisted local powers— South Korea, Taiwan, 
and the countries of the Association of South-East-Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).
At present, it is not clear how long this new Asia
would persist. Everything depended upon continuation of
2 S^mo-Soviet enmity. J And despite the wars and threats of 
wars in 1979> the scare resulting from the Sino-Soviet con­
frontation over Vietnam motivated policy-makers in both cap­
itals to return to their policy senses far enough to engage 
jointly in a new search for peace.
A final Asian trend vitally affecting Soviet-Chin- 
ese relations in the 1970s has just been alluded to, namely, 
the rapid growth in status of regional powers. In Northeast
Asia, the most startling examples were South Korea and Tai- 
2 6wan. Their economic influence was felt throughout the
^-^Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analy­
sis of the Polemics (Cranburys Associated University
Presses, Inc., 1976)* pp. 16-21.
26Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. pp. 122-12 .^
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Western world and even penetrated the Middle East. Each con­
structed a military force increasingly representative of its 
new economic power. Despite their need for continued high- 
technology American assistance, their own efforts were 
largely sufficient to deter attack from their very heavily 
armed communist antagonists. In Southeast Asia, the same 
role was played by the newly reunited Vietnam state, with the 
obvious difference that Vietnam's strength derived almost 
entirely from its military success and was bought at high 
cost in economic hardship and popular distress. It was the 
military stalwartness of the Vietnamese that made it possi­
ble to reunite all of Indochina under one rule, and it was 
this reunification that, in turn, upset the delicate commun- 
ist-noncommunist military balance in Southeast Asia as a 
whole.
Amidst all of these major changes, it is startling
27that Soviet-Chmese relations remained so stable. One 
reason surely was that both Moscow and Beijing were afraid 
that the very rapidity of these changes could work to the 
advantage of the other side. Hence, their reaction was to 
continue the status quo in Sino-Soviet relations and to deal 
with external problems as they arose. Another reason was 
that, with Soviet-Chinese relations reduced to military con­
frontation and conflict too severe even to contemplate, a 
reasonable strategy for both was to do battle against the
27Ibid., pp. 152-154.
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other indirectly. This meant supporting one or another of 
the antagonists in war, or, to the extent possible, standing 
on opposite sides of the nonmilitary trends in the regions 
just noted. Other reasons for Soviet-Chinese stability stem 
from the changing character of the international system and 
the evolution of events in China and the Soviet Union. Suf­
fice it to say here that if all of these factors resulted in 
temporary stability in Soviet-Chinese relations, once the 
effects of these changes have been absorbed, Moscow and Bei­
jing may conclude that the time is ripe for addressing, and 
then solving on their merits, the whole range of differences 
that have separated them for more than two decades.
The 1970s also saw changes in the general interna­
tional system that were more revolutionary than in any of 
the decades of the 20th Century, save perhaps those associ­
ated with the two world wars, and surely held more potential 
for further change than any single decade in two centuries. 
Moreover, as in Asia, it was all that China and the Soviet 
Union could do to keep up with these changes and their
p Q
effects on their respective societies and foreign policies. 
Again, the apparent stability in Soviet-Chinese relations 
may be both artificial and temporary, depending among other 
factors whether the rapidity of international systemic 
changes will now diminish, whether the two societies can
2 8Gary K. Bertsch, et al., Comparative Communism:
The Soviet. Chinese, and Yugoslav Models (San Francisco:
W.R. Freeman and Company, 1976), pp. A1-A5.
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successfully grapple with the changes, and whether those 
changes themselves will at last vitally affect the futures 
of Moscow and Beijing.
Changes in the international system in the 1970s can 
be summarized by noting the effects of five trends. The 
most important was continued dominance of the international 
system by military competition between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. This imparted to the system a residual 
bipolarism that influenced all issues and trends. i/tfhat 
changed, of course, was the rise in raw power of the Soviet 
Union and the relative decline of that of the United States. 
By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had clearly drawn 
abreast of the United States in overall military strength 
and threatened American dominance in other measures of power 
as well.^
Certainly the 1980s could witness a period of overall 
Soviet military superiority, however temporary that might 
prove to be. Never mind why the Soviet Union chooses to pay 
such a high price in terms of overall development to assure 
conventional and strategic equality/superiority with, or 
over, the United States.^ The point is that the Soviet 
Union built itself up militarily partly as a means of deter­
ring the Chinese and partly to achieve overall equality with 
the United States.
29^Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. pp. 10-11.
3°Xbid., p. 11.
41
This implies that Moscow perceived it to be neces­
sary to possess greater military strength than the armaments 
likely to be arrayed against it by America and China at the 
same time.-^ 1 Thus, the criticalness for global military 
stability of Sino-Soviet relations has risen steeply in 
recent years merely because of the changed military equation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Equally important, this new American-Soviet military 
relationship severely modified, if not totally overcame, the 
effects of four other international trends during the 1970s. 
One of these was the replacement of Cold War, East-West 
enmity with a somewhat more relaxed feeling of cooperation 
and even harmony in many spheres. As many Cold War barriers 
came down, it became possible to think of East-West relations 
based on trade, cultural exchange, the flow of mutually bene­
ficial ideas, and attack upon common global problems. These
currents obviously influenced the Soviet Union more than 
32China, although the degree of penetration of Western ideas 
still seemed superficial and was always subject to the con­
trol of Soviet authorities. As for China, only after Mao's 
death did Beijing even begin to open itself to renewed West­
ern influence; after several years it was still not clear
31C.L. Sulzberger, The Coldest Wart Russia's Game 
in China (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1974),
pp. 60-66.
32J R, Keesing, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Son^I 1969)» pp. 93-96.
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whether the modernization-related changes which the new 
Chinese leadership was attempting to carry out would not he 
reversed after a short period of experimentation.
There was one beneficial influence of the major 
changes in the international system during the 1970si in 
both the Soviet and Chinese cases, the classical Leninist- 
Marxist bifurcation of every aspect of international rela­
tions into mutually antagonistic Eastern and Western com­
ponents was modified if not entirely set aside. Neither 
Moscow nor Beijing felt itself threatened from all sides by 
a predatory capitalist world. Indeed, both strongly inter­
acted with, and grew in many regards to admire, the West, 
thus lessening the need to stand together in an unfriendly 
world. Conversely, the decline in perceived ideological 
pressure from the outside meant that both communist giants 
could pay more attention to solving their respective domes­
tic problems and conducting bilateral political battles. 
Thus, paradoxically, the slackening of tensions between East 
and West became a precondition for exacerbating, over the 
short-run, tensions between the two most important communist 
countries.
Whatever the reality, the Soviet Union and China 
looked upon interdependence with envy, not merely because 
socialist societies and economies are by nature autarkic, 
but more importantly because the socialist world was largely
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left out of these exciting developments.*^ To be left aside 
was to be left behind, and Russia and China, each in its own 
way, sought to gain the benefits of interdependence while 
minimizing the costs associated with the dismantling of 
autarky. Moscow and Beijing were like moths circling an 
attractive but clearly destructive flame.
Were it to become the dominant mode of communist 
dealings with the West, interdependence could lead to irre­
versible changes in Soviet and Chinese attitudes and policies 
toward the United States, Europe, and Japan. Further, were 
it ever decided that East-West cooperation rather than all- 
out competition was best, little would be left of the ideo­
logical imperative to overthrow capitalism by force. Com­
munists in Moscow and Beijing could then think in realistic 
and favorable terms about convergence, and of socialism and 
capitalism as alternative and not necessarily antagonistic 
means of modernization. Thus, a little bit of East-West 
interdependence would go a long way toward preventing recon­
stitution of joint Sino-Soviet ideological opposition to the 
outside world.
By the end of the 1970s, the question for Sino- 
Soviet relations was how the influence of these new aspects 
of the Asian subsystem would affect the military rivalry 
between the two. Soviet-Chinese relations ought to have
-^George Gmsburgs, et al., The Sino-Soviet Terri­
torial Dispute. 1949-64 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1978), pp. 48-55-
l±lJ,
been modified by these factors as much as they changed the 
character of international relations. Obviously, a major 
portion of the answer must be traced to the dominant weight 
of the military factor. Nhen two enormous and powerful
countries share a very long border and have a falling out
. . . 3Athat leads eventually to military confrontation, every­
thing else becomes secondary in importance. Still, that 
does not explain all. An additional, important,and continu­
ing element is the propensity of both communist states to 
insulate their problems from outside scrutiny and influence. 
The Sino-Soviet dispute began as an internecine ideological 
dispute and has retained elements of an argument between 
believers within one fold. It is true that, as differences 
became more serious and as both states began to fear the 
worst from the other, each looked to the outside for assis­
tance against the other. That call has gone farther in the 
case of the Chinese who, being the weaker party, must natur­
ally seek allies wherever they can be found. Nonetheless, 
it is startling how little Moscow and Beijing have allowed 
their conflict to modify their respective policies toward 
other countries when that modification is measured in terms 
of actual expenditure of resources.
It is true that mutual problems and fears have
J 0. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. A67-A71.
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severely warped both Moscow’s and Beijing's otherwise natural
1 < .policy of opposition to the West. But it is remarkable 
how little irreversible change in the relationship has occur­
red as a consequence of the factors mentioned above. How 
long this relative insulation of Soviet-Chinese problems from 
these other, changing, aspects of the international system 
can continue is unclear. But so long as both Russia and 
China are reasonably self-sufficient economically and so long 
as their respective communist parties continue to place the 
highest value on ideological, economic, and sociological 
autarky, it is likely that the influence of changes in the 
international system on Sino-Soviet relations will not be 
gre at.
Perhaps the 1980s will finally see international 
systemic factors breaking through the dike set up by the 
militarization of Sino-Soviet relations and the still suc­
cessful attempt to insulate their differences from outside 
influence. It is more likely, however, that restoration of 
reasonably good Sino-Soviet relations will strengthen fur­
ther the propensity in both communist capitals to address 
their common problems in isolation from the rest of the 
world. Conversely, restoration of a measure of Soviet-Chin- 
ese harmony would itself be of such great importance to the 
Asian subsystem that these other factors would, in turn, 
undergo severe modification. What their revised effect on
35Ibid., p. iP73.
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Moscow-Beijing relations under such circumstances would be 
is impossible to say.
In the 1970s, major changes occurred in China and 
the Soviet Union, some of which affected the course of Sino- 
Soviet relations. The death of Mao Tse-tung, the reversal 
of many of his policies, and the new emphasis upon moderni­
zation all seemed to enhance prospects for changes in Chinese
37foreign policy favorable to bettering Sino-Soviet ties. '
After all, it was Mao himself who often singlehandedly kept 
China on the path of stringent anti-Sovietism. His departure, 
along with the arrest or decline of his erstwhile followers, 
removed one impediment to eventual rapprochement with Moscow. 
Indeed, were it not for the Soviet military threat and the 
comparatively greater economic attractiveness of China to 
the West, it is likely that Soviet-Chinese relations would 
already have improved. To be sure, domestic changes do not 
always give rise to corresponding changes in foreign policy. 
But in the past the general character and direction of devel­
opments inside China were closely associated with, and usual­
ly led, changes in Chinese foreign policy.
The mere fact of momentum in Chinese foreign policy 
was also responsible for the nonevolutionary character over 
the short-term of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union.
-^Drew Middleton, The Duel of the Giants; China and 
Russia in Asia (New Yorks Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), 
pp. 55-59.
%
^^Ibid., p. 63.
^7
Such unfinished business as completing normalization with 
the United States, establishing a solid working relationship 
with Japan, and demonstrating China's status as a regional 
power in Southeast Asia all had to be taken care of before 
Beijing felt itself strong enough to approach negotiations 
with Moscow on the basis of reasonable equality. The domes­
tic requisite for many of these foreign policy changes was 
the strengthening of the country economically; that is what 
China after 1976 began in earnest.
The Chinese modernization drive will affect Sino- 
Soviet relations in three ways. Firstly, China will even­
tually decide it is strong enough to drive a more equal bar­
gain with Moscow. Secondly, economic modernization will 
inevitably change the character of Chinese socialist society 
to look more and more like Soviet socialist society. At some 
point, bureaucratic authoritarianism will come to dominate 
China just as it has the Soviet Union. Thirdly, successful 
modernization will allow the domestic pragmatists to speak: 
out on foreign policy issues from a stronger power base. The 
probability is strong that they will favor melioration of 
relations with Moscow.
If there have been several important changes in China 
relevant to Sino-Soviet relations, such was not the case in 
the Soviet Union. Down to mid-1979, there have been no major 
changes, no reversals of course economically, and no swift 
modification of the character of Soviet society. Things
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always move slowly in Moscow and elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union. Nonetheless, two domestic trends seem relevant to 
Soviet policies toward China. One is the increasing ideolo­
gical conservatism of the Moscow leadership. Depending on 
how one views Mao's own ideological pretensions and how his 
successors changed Beijing's ideological emphasis, such 
Soviet conservatism may cause the Kremlin to be somewhat more 
sympathetic to the Chinese world outlook than previously.
Mao was a radical, utopian visionary. His successors cer­
tainly are not. They are pragmatic and decisively uninter­
ested over the short-term in diverting many Chinese resources 
to furthering revolutionary communism throughout the world.^ 
Their interest is in building up China economically and mili­
tarily. These are nearly the same goals as the Soviet lead­
ership sets for Russia, the only difference being that Moscow 
has more power to apply to foreign policy than does Beijing. 
But as the Soviet moves further along in the national process 
of ideological ossification, and as the value of the Soviet 
industrial plant steadily increases, so also does the Soviet 
leadership's propensity to go more slowly in foreign policy 
ventures.
The other domestic Soviet trend is the rapidly 
increasing bureaucratization of Soviet society. This has
-^Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 155-157-
k9
39a double effect on Soviet foreign policy. Firstly, it 
makes it ever more, difficult for the Kremlin to carry out 
foreign policy initiatives. Secondly, it brings an increase 
in tension between populace and government that will give 
added impetus to any Soviet leadership to clear away problems 
with Beijing. This is not to say that the Kremlin is anxious 
to compromise its policies toward Beijing merely to address 
domestic problems. The history of Sino-Soviet relations dur­
ing the last decade indicates that Moscow would like to
improve relations with Beijing for foreign policy reasons 
40alone. But as these domestic Soviet trends become increas­
ingly important, the pressure to try for a modus vivendi with 
the Chinese will surely increase.
In sum, the influence on Sino-Soviet relations of 
domestic forces and trends in the' Soviet Union and China is 
clear. Domestic concerns drive Moscow and Beijing to look 
with ever greater favor on improving relations with the other, 
or at least not worsening relations. Kence, for the first 
time since Mao's death in 1976, domestic trends in the two 
countries point their foreign policies in the same direction. 
The Kremlin has relatively greater control over its own domes­
tic fate and hence can better modulate the effects of domes­
tic factors on its policy toward China. China oscillates in
39It>id., p. 159.
l\,0, .
Middleton, Duel of the Giants, pp. 223-?229.
50
its foreign policy largely due to policy variations at home. 
Moreover, China's foreign policy tends to change faster 
than that of the Soviet Union and is thus affected more 
rapidly. In a statistical sense, this means that domestic 
Chinese conditions favoring improved Sino-Soviet relations 
are likely to appear periodically.
It is well to remind ourselves of these recent events 
and then to consider Soviet and Chinese strategies as they 
conduct their negotiations. The years 1978 and 1979 saw a 
rapid development of events that brought the two countries 
to the brink of war-. The sequence is well-known. In early 
1978, Moscow failed to achieve a breakthrough in its economic 
sind political relations with Tokyo. This, combined with Jap­
anese perceptions of a greater Soviet military threat and 
Chinese promises of a vast improvement in Sino-Japanese eco­
nomic relations, drove Tokyo into the arms of Beijing. 
Therefore, the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty was signed, 
which was correctly interpreted as an anti-Soviet move on 
Tokyo's part and which formed one leg of what the USSR per­
ceived as an emerging and hostile American-Chinese-Japanese 
cooperative relationship. Moscow struck back by signing a 
treaty of alliance with Vietnam which was not only anti-Chin­
ese but which permitted Vietnam, in Moscow's eyes, to invade 
Cambodia without fear of a Chinese military response which 
it could not handle.
But China was constrained by geography and its own
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military backwardness to limit its incursion in Vietnam and 
could go no further than the edges of the Red River Delta 
Plain. More importantly, Beijing directly felt the pressure 
of Soviet maneuvers along the Sino-Soviet border, and, al­
though no conclusive documentary evidence is yet available, 
the USSR likely conveyed threats to take direct action against 
China. China wisely stepped back from the brink of war by 
claiming that it had achieved its goals in Vietnam and with­
drawing. It then seized upon the occasion of the expiration 
of the old 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty to suggest that the two 
states begin the process in earnest of working out a new 
relationship. It took the catharsis of confrontation to 
bring the Chinese to the realization that a further deterior­
ation in relations with the Soviet Union could lead to a 
spiralling conflict that could only end in nuclear war. It 
was this catharsis, then, combined with the broader trends 
noted above, that initiated the slow process of improvement 
of relations between China and the Soviet Union.
Other considerations pointed in the same direction.
On the Chinese side, three elements emerged in mid-1979»
For one, China by then had restored close ties with Japan 
and the United States and looked forward to similar success 
with India. This would take care of three of the four major 
powers on China's periphery, thus olearing the decks for a 
direct approach to Moscow. Secondly, there was an objective 
need to replace the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty with some other.
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instrument, statement, or understanding that would define 
Moscow-Beijing relations. In the wake of the Soviet-Viet- 
namese crisis in 1979* the Chinese had formally given notice 
of their intention to allow the treaty to expire according 
to its one-year denunciatory clause. Now some in Beijing 
felt, not unreasonably, that the time had come to place 
Sino-Soviet relations on a more realistic formal basis. The 
evidence indicates that this argument was raised in high 
policy meetings during the spring of 1979* Finally, by 
early 1979» it had become clear that the Chinese moderniza­
tion program was not only too ambitious but that, even with 
severe reductions in the scope of the four modernizations, 
Beijing would need to look to all suppliers of technology 
and capital if it were to succeed. Obviously, this would 
include the Soviet Union who was a major supplier to China 
during the 1950s. In sum, China was driven by the necessi­
ties of diplomacy and economics to look more favorably upon 
improving relations with the Soviet.
From the very beginning of its dispute with China, 
the Soviet Union had offered to compromise their several 
disputes. But in each instance, Soviet policy and style was 
to complement such offers with safeguards to its own secur­
ity, that is, the snapping of economic relations, the attempt 
to isolate China diplomatically, ideologically, and geogra­
phically, and the enormous overgarrisoning of its border with 
China.
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Major impediments might render this process still-
l± l . .
born. One is Korea. For years, Moscow and Beijing have 
competed for influence in Pyongyang, one result of which was 
North Korea's major military build-up. This threatened South 
Korea and made difficult any real progress toward solution of 
the Korean issue. However, with a positive turn in Sino- 
Soviet relations, accompanied in all probability by continued 
downward movement in Soviet-American relations and a halt in 
improvement of ties between China and America, important 
obstacles impeding joint Soviet-Chinese support for North 
Korea would be removed. Thus, Korea would not likely be a 
problem were Moscow and Beijing to meliorate their own rela­
tions. The probability of a negotiated solution to the 
Korean problem might decline therewith and the prospects for 
war on the peninsula might even increase. The point, how­
ever, is that nothing in the Moscow-Pyongyang-Beijing tri­
angle makes it impossible for the two communist giants to
cooperate with each other (and with Pyongyang) rather than
Ll 2
to compete for influence m  the North.
The most important aspect of a general agreement 
would be settlement of the military and border issue, the 
impediment to improved Sino-Soviet ties. Settlement of that 
problem would, of course, pose a serious threat for the 
United States, for thereafter both Moscow and Beijing could
41
Solomon, Asian Security in the 1980s. p. 110.
42Ibid.
5^
concentrate resources and attention in different areas and 
not dissipate their energies in fratricidal competition 
across their common frontier and around each other's peri­
pheries. This possibility is made all the more real once 
the border question is considered directly. It has been 
clear for many years that, as mentioned above, the border 
problem is solvable on its merits at any moment. The real 
problem is not the border as such but the military imbalance 
in favor of the Soviet Union and the high concentration of 
forces on both sides of the boundary. As the years go by, 
China's military strength can only increase; and although 
in the foreseeable future it is not likely to equal that of 
the Soviet Union, the relative imbalance could right itself 
as China invests in new military technology and imports up- 
to-date weapons systems from the West. Thus, short-term 
improvement in Chinese military ties with Europe and Amer­
ica could, in the long-run, enhance prospects for resolving 
the military stand-off between Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, 
for the first time since 1959* Beijing, as well as Moscow, 
may seriously be attempting to resolve this issue, the most 
important Sino-Soviet difference. With Mao gone and the 
1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty no more, Beijing may have decided 
that the time is ripe to approach Moscow to work out a fresh 
start.
Since 1950» the Soviet Union has found Asia an 
increasingly difficult region to penetrate. One after
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another, countries that historically were weak increased 
dramatically in strength. The way was led by China and 
all other states of Northeast Asia followed. In each case, 
the Soviet Union found it harder and harder to exert its 
influence until, in most cases, it was physically excluded 
and could conduct only a military policy from within its 
own borders or in international waters or air space. It 
then turned to South and Southeast Asia where, thanks to 
the volatility of the situation and the weakness of the 
indigenous states, it was at least partly successful. But, 
by the end of the 1970s, those regions also saw strong 
governments replacing weak ones. Here also, therefore, 
Moscow found it increasingly difficult to exert its influ­
ence. It had to depend on chance opportunities presented 
by regional conflicts or internal revolution to continue 
and, sometimes, to extend its operations.
56
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND 
ITS IMPACT ON NORTH KOREA
Pendulum of the North Korean Exercise Between 
Beijing and Moscow
The super powers have been relatively free to shape 
their policies toward one another, but each has sought to 
win the support of its allies for major moves affecting 
world tensions. North and South Korea, by contrast, would 
appear to be much more constrained by dependence on outside 
allies than the larger powers. Thus, some South Koreans 
have argued that Koreans have become accustomed to think­
ing that their division was a result of the East-West Cold 
War, because— at least in the 1950s and 1960s--opposition 
from the great powers could have made unification impossi­
ble. Others hold that, even in the 1970s, the prospects 
of North-South rapprochement depend on East-West detente.
The regime of Kim Il-Sung, on the other hand, 
emphasizing self-identity and self-reliance (chu che) at 
least since 1955» has pursued a rather autonomous course, 
either ignoring Russian and Chinese preferences or playing 
them off against each other. Despite these tactics, the 
North Koreans have enjoyed considerable support from Moscow 
or Beijing or from both over the years, though the magnitude
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of foreign assistance to the Republic of Korea has been 
even greater. Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow cooled 
after 1962, following the Cuban missile retreat and the 
Soviet stand on the Sino-Indian frontier disputes. Follow­
ing Kosygin's February, 1965* visit to North Korea, however, 
Soviet assistance resumed again, though Moscow seems to have 
been concerned in 1968 and 1969 lest the Pueblo and EC-121 
incidents lead to a major United States-North Korea confron­
tation. North Korea's relations with PRC deteriorated in 
the mid-1960s, tensions mounting during PRC's Cultural Revo­
lution to the point that Red Guards put up wall posters in 
Beijing calling Kim II-Sung a "counterrevolutionary revi­
sionist" as well as a "millionaire, an aristocrat, and a 
leading bourgeois element in Korea." In 1968-1969t border 
clashes were reported between Chinese and.North Korean 
forces, amid signs that Beijing wanted territorial "compen­
sation" for the intervention of its "volunteers" in the 
Korean War. By 1969-1970, however, Chinese-North Korean 
relations had turned dramatically for the better. Beijing 
signed a five-year aid agreement with the North Koreans and 
quietly dropped its claim to a 100-square mile strip of 
North Korean territory bordering Manchuria. In November, 
1970, Kim II-Sung took the occasion of the Fifth Congress 
of the Korean Workers Party to assert that "revisionism" had 
appeared in the international communist movement and ob­
structed its unity and cohesion, causing ideological confu­
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sion. Without harming the Soviet Union directly, Kim criti­
cized revisionism for obscuring the line of demarcation 
between friend and foe, yielding to United States' imperial­
ism, scared at its policy of nuclear blackmail, and casting 
sheep's eyes at the imperialists while playing lip-service 
to an anti-imperialist position. After hearing these and 
other oblique attacks on the USSR, the party congress affirm­
ed the North Korea's independent line.
Friendly relations between North Korea and PRC were 
restored after the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April, 1969# 
which marked the end of the most intense phase of the Cul­
tural Revolution. As the Cultural Revolution in China drew 
to a close at the end of 1969i Beijing apparently decided 
to relax its policy of self-imposed isolation and attempted 
to reestablish normal political relations with selected 
countries, including North Korea. The North Korean Com­
munists once again seemed to feel that they had leaned too 
far in one direction. There were some indications that 
Soviet economic help had not been as abundant as anticipated 
and that Pyongyang wanted to build a military and economic 
base more independent of Moscow. A major factor contribu­
ting to the revival of Pyongyang-Beijing friendship was 
their shared hostility toward Japan and their increased fear 
of Japan's growing strength. During 1969 and 1970, two sig­
nificant developments seemed to forerun a larger future role 
for the Japanese in Asian security arrangements, reinforcing
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North Korean fears. First was the Nixon Doctrine announced
in November, 1969, which implicitly urged a more positive
A 3Japanese role in the maintenance of the Asian security. ^
Second was the Nixon-Sato joint communique in which Premier
Sato stated that the maintenance of peace and security in
the Taiwan area was . . . a most important factor for the
security of Japan and that "the security of the Republic of
AAKorea was essential to Japan*s own security." Speaking 
at the National Press Club in Washington, the Premier reem­
phasized the importance of Korea to Japan's security.
The main turning point in Sino-North Korean relations 
probably was Premier Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea dur­
ing April, 1970. Kis visit was the first by a top-level 
Chinese official since President Liu Shao-chi visited North 
Korea in 1963* Chou's speech, delivered upon his arrival at 
the Pyongyang airport, clearly conveyed Beijing's desire to 
restore friendly relations with North Korea. Recalling their 
blood-cemented militant friendship, Chou said: "China and
Korea are neighbors as closely related as lips and teeth, 
and our two peoples are intimate b r o t h e r s . D u r i n g  his
A 3-'Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Wash­
ington: The Brookings Institution, 1975)» pp. 2-5*
AA
The New York Times. November 22, 1969* pp. 1 and 
1^? United States Foreign Policy. 1969-1970 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 5C3“5°5‘
^ The New York Times. 7 and 8 April 1970; Far Eastern 
Economic Review. April 11, 1970, pp. 33-3A.
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visit, Chou loudly denounced U.S.-Japanese collusion and, 
probably out of consideration for his hosts, avoided public 
attacks on the Soviet Union.
Sino-North Korean contacts, which had withered since 
1965, resumed after late 1968. In February, 1970, a new 
North Korean ambassador was sent to Beijing, and a new Chin­
ese ambassador took up his North Korean post on March 23,
1970. In November, 1970, Beijing, reportedly dropped its
long-standing claim for cession of a hundred-square mile
A6strip of North Korean territory around Mt. Faektu. Beijing 
initially made the demand in 1965 when North Korea drifted to 
the Soviet camp.
As Sino-North Korean relations improved considerably 
after late 1969, North Korea's relations with Moscow cooled 
somewhat. However, it should be emphasized that North Korea 
did not intend to break away from Moscow as she had done in 
1962. Pyongyang relations with Moscow slipped in the wake 
of the downing of an EC-121 American intelligence aircraft 
on April 15, 1969* While China promptly praised North Korea, 
the Soviet Union waited three days to endorse the North 
Korean attack, and Soviet ships joined the U.S. Navy in the
lLr7
search for possible survivors. President Nikolai Podgor- 
ney's visit to North Korea the following month probably was
A6
The New York Times. 23 November 1970, PP« 6-9-
A 7'B.C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification,"
Asian Survey XI (May 1971)*A86.
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designed to restrain Pyongyang's excessively bellicose pos­
ture. The Soviet reaction to the EC-121 incident did not 
please North Korea.
While in Pyongyang, Podgorny attempted to gain North 
Korean support for Moscow's position concerning the Sino- 
Soviet border dispute of 1969 and to win Pyongyang's parti­
cipation in the Moscow conference of world communist parties 
the following month. But North Korea took a neutral posi­
tion on the border dispute issue, and the North Koreans
refused to attend the Moscow Conference, joining China on
A8the list of absent parties.
Beijing and Pyongyang stood together on two important 
issues: support for Cambodia's ousted chief of state, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, and opposition to the revival of Japanese 
militarism and aggression. When Sihanouk formed a govern­
ment- in- exile in Beijing early in 1970* China and North 
Korea immediately recognized the exile government, while the 
Soviet Union continued to recognize Lon Nol's government in 
Phnom Penh. Despite North Korea's veiled criticism of Mos­
cow' s insensitivity to growing Japanese militarism, Moscow 
continued its friendly gestures toward Tokyo.
The first indication of disagreement between North 
Korea and the Soviet Union surfaced publicly when North Korea
1
announced its decision to withdraw from a joint Soviet-North 
A8
The New York Times. 11 May 1969, P« 8 ; New York 
Times 20 May 1969, p"i 18.
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Korean oceanographic study of the sea of Japan. 'The reason 
was Moscow's unilateral decision to include Japanese scien­
tists in the research project, which was originally under­
taken on the basis of scientific and technological coopera- 
tion between Moscow and Pyongyang. '
North Korea's deteriorating relations with Moscow 
were confirmed at the Fifth Congress of the Korean Worker's 
Party held in November, 1969* In his report to the Congress, 
Kim criticized the Soviet Union asserting that revisionism 
appeared in the international communist movement and ob­
structed its unity and cohesion, causing ideological confu­
sion.
On July 16, 1971» President Richard M. Nixon 
announced that he would make an official trip to Beijing 
in 1972, and less than three months later, on October 12, 
Washington and Moscow announced that Nixon would also visit 
the Soviet Union that year. Nixon's scheduled visits to 
both Beijing and Moscow in 1972 undoubtedly caused serious 
apprehension in Pyongyang, but North Korea was much more 
concerned with the consequences of Nixon's journey to Bei­
jing than with his trip to Moscow. This was perhaps because 
the Moscow visit was the less dramatic and unusual by far.
North Korea referred to Nixon's forthcoming Beijing 
visit as not the march of a victor but a trip of the defeated.
4 9
North Korea Leaves Joint Soviet-Korean Oceanogra­
phic Project," Radio Free Europe Research (March 1 ,^ 1970): 
1-3.
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Although North Korea offered reassurance that Nixon's visit 
would not affect Pyongyang's relations with Beijing, the 
Korean Worker's Party organ expressed some misgivings and 
subtly demanded an acceptable explanation of the trip.--^
North Korea's concern about Washington-Beijing rapproche­
ment had some impact on Pyongyang's relationship with Bei­
jing. For example, tbe October 25, 1971* commemoration of 
China's entry into the Korean Conflict passed almost unmarked 
in each country, m  sharp contrast to 1970.
Realizing North Korea's apprehension over Nixon's 
Beijing visit, Chinese leaders made a considerable effort 
to reassure North Korea. Even before the announcement, Bei­
jing proclaimed July 9-15 as Chinese-Korean Friendship
2^ • . . •Week. Upon receiving additional economic and military
assistance and assurances from China, Kim II-Sung then 
announced that Nixon's China trip would temporarily ease 
international tension. In his statement, Kim again stressed 
that Sino-American rapprochement had no direct bearing on 
North Korea. Chou En-lai had apparently succeeded in per­
suading Kim II-Sung to accept the new Sino-American rela­
tionship.
^°The New York Times, 11 August 1971* P« 5«
<1
J Robert Simmons, "North Korea: Year of the Thaw," 
Asian Survey XII (January 1972)i31«
^Ibid., pp. 30-31*
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North Korea's concern over Nixon's journey to Bei­
jing was shared fully by Moscow. Apparently to counter the 
Sino-American rapprochement, for instance, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko suddenly visited Japan just before 
President Nixon's visit to Beijing and agreed with Japanese 
leaders to open negotiations within 1972 for a Japanese- 
Soviet peace treaty. The Soviet Union seemed to use the 
situation to strengthen her position in North Korea by pro­
viding additional economic and military assistance and ex­
changing high-level delegations. Meanwhile, North Korea 
made an effort to utilize the Nixon visit to Beijing to 
strengthen its relations with Moscow. There is no doubt 
that Pyongyang became more intimate with Moscow.
As Nixon's visit to Beijing neared, there were 
unusually frequent exchange of high-ranking delegations 
between Moscow and Pyongyang. A high-level Soviet delga- 
tion, led by Sharaf R. Rashodov, First Secretary of the 
Uzbekistan Communist Party, came to Pyongyang, probably to 
inform and assure the North Korean's communists about Nixon's 
forthcoming Moscow visit. While in North Korea, Rashodov 
made an unusually strong statement in support of Korean 
unification under communist leadership. During the week 
prior to Nixon's Beijing visit, the Soviet press accused 
Beijing of breaking the solidarity of the communist camp by 
receiving President Nixon. Although North Korea bitterly 
criticized the United States, without mentioning Nixon's
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arrival in Beijing, the North Korean's shied away from 
siding with Moscow's criticism of Beijing.
Immediately after Nixon's Moscow visit, the Soviet 
Union dispatched two separate delegations to North Korea.
The first delegation, composed of Foreign Ministry officials, 
came to Pyongyang apparently to inform the North Koreans of 
the Nixon-Brezhnev talks and agreements. During the confer­
ence, the Soviet Union reportedly agreed to increase its 
deliveries of certain industrial equipment and raw materials, 
to expand scientific and technical cooperation.
The display of friendship between Moscow and Pyong­
yang during these periods served the common interests of 
both countries. For North Korea, the display of friendship 
toward the Soviets might have been a well-planned act of 
political maneuvering both to reassure Soviet assistance and 
to warn Beijing not to go too far in its relations with Wash­
ington. For the Soviet Union, it was a good opportunity to 
bring North Korea closer to its side by capitalizing on Pyong­
yang' s apprehension over the new Sino-American relationship. 
Despite the warm display of North Korean-Soviet cooperation 
and the obvious campaign that the Russians waged to promote 
their influence in North Korea at China's expense, the Soviet 
Union apparently had only limited success. The North Korean 
refrained from siding with Moscow against Beijing* In gen­
eral, North Korea appeared to be still closer to Beijing 
than to Moscow.
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Foreign Trade As An Indicator of 
Sino-Soviet Conflict
Looking Back
The Chinese have always been exceptionally reluc­
tant to publish meaningful data on any aspect of their 
economic situation, and in foreign trade, Moscow and Beijing 
continue to conceal the nature and full extent of their eco­
nomic ties.
However, during the Stalin period, the Soviet Union 
negotiated directly with the Manchurian warlord in July,
1949, concerning the restoriation of Soviet-dismantled 
industries in Manchuria, but the final treaty of April,
1950, designated the contracting parties as the PRC and the 
Soviet Union. Thus, the PRC were temporarily forced to 
assume the obligations which Manchuria incurred as a result 
of her relatively weaker bargaining position.
From then on, Soviet machines, equipment, and other 
industrial goods were exchanged for industrial and agricul­
tural raw materials from the PRC. Sino-Soviet trade was 
more closely geared to Chinese than to Soviet requirements. 
Some of the Soviet deliveries, however, were simply transfers 
of captured Chinese assets and reparations or of military aid 
consigned from stocks stored during the Korean War.^
^Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 231.
TABLE I
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SOVIET-SINO TRADE 
(in Million U.S. Dollars)
Soviet Soviet
Exports Imports Balance
Ye ar to PRC from PRC Turnover Soviet PRC
1955 742.50 643.50 1386.00 99.00
1956 733.00 764.25 1497.25 31.25
1957 544.00 738.25 1282.25 194.25
1958 633*90 881.20 1515.10 247.30
1959 954.45 1100.25 2054.70 145.80
I960 817.00 848.00 I665.OO 31.00
1961 367.33 551-44 918.77 184.11
1962 233.21 515.84 749.03 284.61
1963 187.03 412.59 559.62 225.56
1964 135.20 313.91 449.11 178.71
Total surpluses 99.00 1520.59
Sources: National Foreign Assessment Center,
Central Intelligence Agency, China: Economic Indicators
(Washington, D.C.: December, 1978)i 39» The Soviet
Union: Figures-Facts-Data (United States Government Manual)
(New York: K.G. Saur Publishers, 1979)i PP« 351-356.
When the PRC was suffering from the dislocation of 
agricultural collectivization post-1956,^ the decline in 
Soviet deliveries aggravated their disenchantment. Further­
more, during the same period, the Soviet Union launched a 
massive aid program to the neutralist countries (mainly 
Egypt, Indonesia, and India) thereby significantly reallo­
cating its foreign aid resources, a step which must have
-^Ibidj), p. 233*
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infuriated the PRC’s leadership and further worsened Sino- 
Soviet relations.
TABLE II
SOVIET-INDIAN TRADE COMPARED WITH 
SOVIET EXPORTS TO PRC
(in Million U.S. Dollars)
Soviet-Indian Trade Soviet-Sino Trade
Soviet Soviet
Year Turnover Inrports Exports Soviet Exports
1955 11.6 5.2 6.4 742.5
1956 57.8 26.4 31.4 733.0
1957 84.5 36.8 4 7.7 544.0
1958 94.8 49.0 45.8 633.9
1959 101.0 63.2 37.7 954.5
i960 91.0 63.O 28.0 817.0
1961 119.0 65.5 53.5 367.3
1962 168.0 83.0 85.0 233.2
1963 316.4 94.7 221.7 187.0
1964 390.2 155.7 234.5 135.2
Sources s Records and Statistics* Quarterlv
Bulletin of Eastern Economist X(4) (August 19^9). (New
Delhi: Asia Press, ) p. 220; Records and Statistics *
Quarterly Bulletin of Eastern Economist XII(4) (August
1966), (New Delhi* Asia Press), p. 216.
In the case of Moscow's policy and gesture towards 
India (between 1955 and 1962, the Soviet Union granted loans 
to India amounting to $800 million),^ which the PRC was 
watching with utmost sensitivity, a brief chronological 
comparison of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian trade relations
-^Between 1955 and 1962, the Soviet Union granted 
loans to India amounting to $800 million (New Age. Septem­
ber 23, 1962), an amount close to the excess of Soviet 
deliveries over imports from China prior to 1955*
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seems appropriate, even though the magnitude of India's 
exchange of goods with the Soviet Union was not in the same 
digital category. Soviet exports to the PRC thus declined 
markedly from 1956 through 1958. While Soviet-Indian trade 
jumped more than 500 percent, decline in Soviet exports to 
the PRC during 1961 paralleled by a near doubling of exports 
to India, the same trend continued during 1964.
Consequently, when the Soviet Union upheld India 
which was another rivalry of the PRC, the reaction of the 
PRC was tremendously jealous. In other words, as India was 
at high tide with the Soviet Union in foreign trade, the 
PRC was at low tide with the Soviet Union. This phenomenon 
alternatively oscillated from 1955 "to 1964. Therefore, the 
foreign trade as an indicator is valuable to evaluate the 
relationship between two countries.
Sino-Soviet Foreign Trade
Then in i960, following the Sino-Soviet split, the 
PRC made a deliberate, major shift in the direction of their 
foreign trade, essentially for political reasons. As in 
1950, the choice was not wholly Beijing's, since Moscow 
withdrew all Soviet technicians from PRC and tried to use 
economic pressure to change PRC policies. But clearly Bei­
jing, on its part, decided to disentangle its interests from 
Moscow's, and In the 1960s it rebuffed all Soviet attempts 
to restore old ties. As a result, trade with the Soviet
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Union dropped rapidly. It declined to 34 percent of total 
trade in 1964. Sino-Soviet relations went from bad to 
worse, culminating in the Chempao Island incident and the 
sharp border clashes of 1969# then in 1969 trade with the 
Soviet Union was $56 million, a mere 1.4 percent of PRC's 
total trade. In the 1970s, trade with the Soviet Union 
again rose in absolute terms, but it continued to decline 
as a percentage of total trade, in 1970 trade with the 
Soviet Union dwindled to 1 percent at its low point, and 
in 1978 trade with the Soviet Union, totalling $338 mil­
lion, was only 1.6 percent of PRC's total trade.
Violations of the Armistice Agreement As An 
Indicator of the Stability of the 
Korean Peninsula
For divided Korea, where the lowlands and mountains 
separating the two sides have been difficult to police, 
large-scale infiltration has probably been checked in recent 
years by the installation of a fence and supporting defensive 
position. The success of these defensive efforts was then 
reflected by an increase in clandestine seaborne landings 
along South Korea's craggy coastline. After concluding the 
truce between North and South Korea in 1953# there were 
countless violations of the armistice agreement. While 58 
violations of the armistice agreement by the North were 
reported in 1971# this was 50^ less than the total in 1970.
In 1972# however, no significant incidents or exchanges of
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TABLE III
SOVIET-SINO TRADE 
(in Million U.S. Dollars)
PRC Trade
Soviet Soviet Soviet
Exports Imports Trade
Year to PRC from PRC Turnover Total Ratio
1964 135.20 313.91 449.ll 3,220 14
1965 191.48 225.33 416.81 3,880 10.7
1966 171.16 142.97 318.13 4,24 5 7.5
1967 50.28 56. 6l 106.89 3,915 2.7
1963 59.27 36.63 95.90 3,785 2.5
1969 27.75 28.97 56.72 3,895 1.4
1970 24.89 21.67 46.56 4, 340 1.1
.1971 77.89 76.22 154.11 4,810 3.2
1972 120.87 133.17 254.04 6,000 4.2
1973 136.50 136.91 273.41 10,300 2.7
1974 143.25 139.42 282.67 14,080 2.0
1975 128.64 149.43 278.07 14,575 1.9
1976 238.54 178.51 417.05 13,275 3.1
1977 160.78 176.44 337.22 15,055 2.2
1973 174.90 I63.8O 338.70 21,100 1.6
Sources: National Foreign Assessment Center, Cent:
Intelligence Agency. Chinas Economic Indicators (Washingt
D.C. : December, 1978), p. 39.
fire were noted in the DM2 or in South Korea--a shift that
can only be attributed to high policy decisions apd not to 
improved defense systems. The total number of significant 
incidents and exchanges of fire within the DM2 and inside 
the South Korea plotted over time were as shown in Table 
IV--Violations of the Armistice Agreement by North Korea.
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TABLE IV
VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT 
BY NORTH KOREA
Year Violations Intensity Ratio
19 65 88 2.4
1966 80 2.2
1967 784 21.5
1968 985 27.0
1969 188 5*2
1970 181 5*0
1971 84 2.3
1972 0 0.0
Sources: Walter C. Clemens, "Grit at Panmunjom:
Conflict and Cooperation in a divided Korea," Asian Survey 
13(6), (1973)s536.
By the way, this writer's assumption was "the more 
intense Sino-Soviet competition becomes over North Korea, 
the more independent military actions of North Korea will 
become" We have to test an association between two pro­
perties— Sino-Soviet competition and North Korean military 
actions.
In Figure 4, the difference between the Sino-Soviet 
conflict and North Korean military actions is not signifi­
cant. Shown on Tables III and IV, a t-test was utilized 
that would test for a significant difference between two 
means of independent samples.
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Figure 4 s Traces of Sino-Soviet Conflict: 
PRC USSR— Crises and Selected
Representative Peak Events—
19 50-1972
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Sources: Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy
of War and Peace (New York: Nichols Publishing Company,
1980), . p . 86"; and graphing of the Violations of the Armis­
tice Agreement by North Korea— Table IV.
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t
Above equation, an estimate of
X1 J N1 + N2 + 2
= 130.93.
The following results were obtained:
+ 298.75 - 4.16 =2.25
= 130.93
There was no significant difference between the Sino-Soviet 
conflict and North Korean military actions. The results of 
t-test was as follows: t = 2 .25« To be significant, the
results would have had to be: (t) = 2.365 or more. Subse­
quently, there is no significant difference between the Sino- 
Soviet conflict and North Korean military actions.
thesis— "the more intense Sino-Soviet competition becomes 
over North Korea, the more independent military actions of 
North Korea will become."
Finally, this writer can accept the project hypo-
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
The Sino-Soviet dispute has had major implications 
for North Korea in formulating policy toward Beijing and 
Moscow. The dispute presented a serious dilemma to the 
North Korean leaders because various political, economic 
and military factors made it difficult for them to avoid 
alienating either of the neighboring communist powers. How­
ever, the dispute presented an opportunity to deal with the 
two powers in such a way as to augment North Korea’s nation­
al interest.
By the autumn of 1962, the North Korean regime had 
begun gradually to lean toward the Chinese line in the 
course of the communist camps' dispute over such matters 
as Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Sino-Indian border 
dispute. From the beginning of 1963 until Khrushchev's 
downfall in October, 1964, North Korea became Beijing's 
strongest ally in Asia in the Sino-Soviet rift.
But Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 changed the situa­
tion. While North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union 
began to improve, its relations with China deteriorated 
slowly. This change reflected an altered view of North
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Korea's national interests namely, Pyongyang's desire to 
modernize its armed forces with new weapons as well as to 
seek economic assistance from the Soviet Union. However, 
this change did not mean the conversion of the North Kor­
ean regime to the Soviet line, nor did it mean a return to 
the pre-1950 Soviet-North Korean relationship. Rather,
North Korea returned to a neutralist posture in the Sino- 
Soviet dispute.
At the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 
1969» North Korea and China restored their friendly rela­
tions. The major factors contributing to the revival of 
Pyongyang-Beijing friendship were their mutual interest in 
improving the deteriorated relationship that had existed 
during the 1966-1969 period and their common fear of Jap­
an* s growing strength, which was becoming increasingly 
evident. But despite its warm relations with China, North 
Korea continued to maintain substantial ties with the 
Soviet Union.
President Nixon's visits to Beijing and Moscow in 
1972 undoubtedly caused serious apprehension within the 
North Korean regime. North Korea was more concerned with 
the outcome of Nixon's trip to Beijing than with his jour- 
new to Moscow. Pyongyang and Moscow fully shared their 
apprehension over Nixon's visit to Beijing, and the Soviet 
Union apparently used the situation to promote its influence 
in North Korea at China's expense by exchanging high-ranking
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delegations and by providing additional economic and mili­
tary assistance. But the Soviet Union achieved only partial 
success.
Most Asian communist regimes and parties seem to 
be trying to preserve relations with both Moscow and Bei­
jing without being excessively dependent upon, or subor­
dinate to, either. Kim Il-Sung's domestic and foreign 
policies claimed to be, and to a large extent were, based 
on the principle of chuche (self-reliance). For economic, 
military, and political reasons, however, North Korea most 
likely will continue to live in the shadow of the two com­
munist powers: The Soviet Union, to which North Korea owes
its creation immediately after World War II, and China, to 
which North Korea owes its survival during the Korean War.
This thesis tested the relationship between Sino- 
Soviet conflict and North Korean military actions. The 
writer found that there was no correlationship between two 
variables. Foreign trade as an indicator of conflict be­
tween two countries was valuable data. But other indica-
%
tors, for example, foreign investment, technology exchanges, 
sports events, and visitors, could be utilized to measure 
the relationship between two countries.
As long as the Sino-Soviet dispute continues, North 
Korea indeed is and increasingly will be in a delicate posi­
tion in its relations with the two neighboring powers, both 
very sensitive about their prestige and power position. 
Therefore, the Pyongyang regime will probably continue to
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be cautious and cricumspect on issues and events that divide 
Moscow and Beijing, while attempting to maintain correct and 
balanced relations with both Beijing and Moscow.
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